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ABSTRACT 
The end of the Cold War ushered the world into a new sphere of democratic governance.  Citizens in developing 
countries began actively contributing to the democratic process by demanding probity and accountability within 
existing governance structures. The international donor community complimented their efforts by responding to 
the challenges of the new ‘wave’ of democratisation in the late 1980s by embracing democracy assistance as a 
core priority.  In January 1993, Ghana inaugurated its Fourth Republic – a transition fraught with challenges that 
continue to blight the development of a democratic culture.  In response to these challenges, the American 
Government stepped in, with financial and technical support, to assist Ghana in mitigating the stalling of 
democratic development. While democracy aid has been caught in a myriad of criticism regarding such issues as 
conditionalities, through the use of matched-area comparison, it is concluded that the USAID-initiated ECSELL 
and GAIT programmes have positively increased local level democratisation in Ghana by strengthening the 
capacities and abilities of civil society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The people of Africa whole-heartedly supported the struggle for independence against colonial rule and 
foreign domination. Independence was satiated with promises and hopes to make Africans masters of their own 
destiny, fulfill their aspirations for a better life, facilitate socio-economic development and result in a definitive 
end to the insalubrious conditions of squalor, superstition, avoidable disease, ignorance, malnutrition and 
poverty. It was also expected that Africans would be wholly in charge of their affairs and decisions would be 
built on African concepts of consensus building.  Such hopes, however, have proven dependent on the ability to 
democratize because economic growth requires some sustained income and productivity (Mobarak 2005: 1).    
Since independence in 1957, Ghana has embarked on four attempts to achieve a workable democratic 
government. In 1959, it emerged as one of the first (de facto) post-colonial one party states in tropical Africa. In 
1969, after suffering from a military coup d’état, Ghana led the region by returning to constitutional government 
in its Second Republic, and transitioned to its Third Republic in 1979.  In January 1993, the country again 
established a precedent when it became the first Sub-Saharan country to elect a democratic government for the 
fourth time. With the establishment of Ghana’s Fourth Republic, the democratization process had begun. 
However, the process was, and still is, fraught with challenges which blight the development of a democratic 
culture. 
Ghana was not alone in this process of democratisation. By the end of 1990, and as a result of the end of 
the Cold War, most African countries, whether through domestic or international pressure, were liberalizing 
autocratic regimes and moving towards participatory democracy where citizenry could hold leadership to 
account for their action and inaction through periodic elections (Clapham 1993: 424). In spite of desirable 
prospects of a potential good  political governance to thrive in Africa, the continent fails to boast of full 
utilisation of these potentials as a results of huge demand of enormous human, material and technical resources 
required within the democratic process (Chabal 1998: 191).  Such resources have failed to be attained by many 
African governments as a result of a wide spectrum of social, political and economic problems ranging from 
continuous war to extreme poverty, worsening terms of trade, drastic reduction in social welfare programmes, 
rising unemployment, rampant corruption and economic mismanagement, inadequate and inappropriate policies 
and practices, poor distribution mechanisms, deteriorating infrastructures, and the ravages of AIDS and other 
pandemic diseases (Boafo-Arthur 2008: 52).  These social, economic and political demands and realities greatly 
compete with the national governance budget in respect of institutions mandated to undertake democratic 
development obligations. These constrain political actors with limited funding options in respect of supporting 
state governance institutions, consequently civil society groups must rung in to support the governance 
institutions to perform. 
In an effort to address these resource issues and support the process of democratization, international 
aid has become a constant and, in many ways, a necessary support mechanism.  Historically, Africa has received 
more per capita aid from the international community in the form of official development assistance than any 
other region in the world (Leonard & Straus 2003). According to Diamond (2004: 263), well over half of all 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.18, 2014 
 
17 
African states were receiving at least 10% of their Gross National Product (GNP) from foreign aid by the late 
1990s, which also accounted for over 50% of African government revenue and 71% of public investment. 
Leonard and Straus (2003) have calculated that most African countries received more in development assistance 
than they collect in tax revenue.  Dependence on external financial aid to support government processes remains 
a stark reality for a number of African countries transitioning to, and maintaining, democratic rule.  Such reality, 
however, has created dichotomous opinions regarding whether external support in the form of donor aid is a help 
or hindrance to the process of democratization.  
The US is a major player in providing donor aid to support processes of democratization. The US began 
channeling funds and resources to Ghana’s democratization process in the form of USAID funded projects. 
Questions have arisen over American interventionist strategies and actual intent due to conditionalities attached 
to aid (Brown 2005:180). Many scholars (Knack 2004: 252; Goldsmith 2001: 125; Djankov et al. 2008: 169) 
argue that foreign aid does little to promote democracy. Others (Finkel et al. 2007: 405), however, continue to 
affirm the efforts American aid strategies are making to democracy promotion.  Thus, the central problem 
examined is the impact democracy assistance has made in the democratization process in Ghana’s Fourth 
Republic.  Specifically, what is the impact of support provided by the US to promote civil society at the local 
level in Ghana? In order to address such question, a number of factors will be considered; the extent to which 
resources activate civil society into political action; the extent to which these funds support the effectiveness of 
civic groups to function at the local level; the extent to which this assistance supports civil society’s capacity 
building and networking within local governance.   
Despite criticisms to American aid initiatives, American assistance in support of Ghana’s 
democratization process has proven successful with respect to its support of local level governance.  Such 
conclusion has been drawn from research surrounding two specific USAID funded programmes – Enhancing 
Civil Society Effectiveness at the Local Level (ECSELL) and Government Accountability Improves Trust 
(GAIT) - both of which were designed to increase the level of transparency and accountability in District 
Assemblies (DAs) and increase the abilities of Civic Unions (CUs) to advance the cause of other members of the 
civil society.  
METHODOLOGY 
The study adopted sequential mixed method to solicit the required information from respondents. The study 
adhered to strict methodological standards in the selection of respondents to ensure that views expressed by the 
sample reflected the perspective of the entire population. To achieve this objective, multi-stage and multi-phase 
sampling procedure were employed to collect primary data from the field. The study adopted two methods of 
data collection 
• Survey  
•  Structured interviews 
The study divided the work into three phases for the purposes of data collection. The first phase of data 
collection included investigation at the offices of USAID and other implementing agencies such as, the 
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 
(NDI), and the Cooperative League of the United States of America (CLUSA). This was done through structured 
interviews. The American Embassy and USAID offices in Accra, as well as other democracy assistance actors in 
Ghana were interviewed to collect and elicit information. 
The second phase involved administration of 165 questionnaires of six different outlines at the district 
level where USAID had implemented democracy assistance programmes. The country was divided into three 
clusters. Cluster one, Northern Ghana made up of Upper East, Upper West and the Northern Region. Cluster two 
contained the middle belt comprising the Brong-Ahafo Region, the Ashanti and Eastern Regions and cluster 
three, Southern Ghana, made up of the Volta, Greater Accra, the Central and Western Regions. The study 
purposively selected Nadowli, Wa and Damango districts to represent the Northern cluster, Berekum and 
Techiman to represent the middle belt and Ga, Dangbe East and Dangbe West for Southern Ghana. The selection 
of the districts was determined after critical demographic and political assessments of the features of the districts.  
It was influenced by the voting pattern, vibrancy of civil society activism and overall District Assembly-society 
relations. The selection was further influenced by the implementation of the ECSELL and GAIT programmes. In 
each cluster, one district that benefited from both programmes and a district that benefited from single 
programme were selected. The structured interviews and administration of questionnaires were conducted at the 
community and district levels. 
The third phase involved interviews with the District Assembly staff. The study sought the views of the 
Assembly staff who were directly involved in the project and staff, which were not connected to the project. The 
objectives of these interviews were to ascertain holistic information about the project and to reduce the level of 
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prejudice. The secondary sources of data collection include perusals of official documents at the Assemblies, 
offices of IFES, GAIT and USAID, and some civil society organizations, implementing agencies, and other 
relevant stakeholders, who contributed to democratic transition and consolidation in Ghana. The Annual Reports, 
evaluations and various assessment reports were consulted.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Democratisation theories, and those which focus specifically on the relationship between a country’s 
level of, or ability to, democratise and the mechanisms supporting those processes, have been central debates 
within political thought (Dahl 1997; Drah 1993; Ninsin 1993). Such theorists have examined specifically the 
conditions which make regimes or political systems more vulnerable to manipulation by the political elite and 
whether such factor affects their level of democratisation.  Generally, theories have been divided into internal 
and external factors and theories which influence democratic development.   
Domestic/Internal Theories 
Structural theory suggests that the existence of structural prerequisites disposes a society towards 
democracy (Lipset 1959; Vanhanen 1990). Once these conditions are met, democracy would flourish. The 
absence of these fundamentals, however, undermines the growth of democracy. Accordingly by developing 
aspects of complex characteristics of economic and social structures in the context of legitimacy and economic 
development, a country’s democratisation process is expected to be accelerated (Lipset 1959).  There is 
significant relationship between education, religion and income levels as well as the level of expected 
democratic progress to be made by a country. Thus, it is argued, democratisation is best achieved by internally 
developing social structures (Olson 1993; Midlarsky 1997).  
Comparatively, proponents of cultural theory (Almond & Verba 1963; Inglehart 1988; Diamond 1992; 
Almond & Powell 1993), explain the emergence and growth – or lack thereof - of democracy in a given country 
by identifying three types of political culture; parochial culture - referring to a situation in which citizens are not 
aware and do not participate in the political system – subject culture – in which people are aware of the political 
process but do not participate in the system - and participant culture – where people are aware of the political 
process and indeed participate in the political process and system. A mix of these cultures constitutes the civic 
culture of a society which determines ‘associational behaviour, tolerance, and interpersonal trust’ (Al-Momani 
2003: 45). Thus, certain cultural practices, quite obviously promote democracy while others obstruct its growth. 
Contextualizing the culturalist perspective, Maxwell Owusu (1972) has observed that, political culture 
encompasses the total environment of ideas, beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, values, judgments, sentiments and 
expectations that shape, define and sustain the relationship between leaders and the led as well as politicians and 
the constituents.   
By contrast, process theorists (Huntington 1993; Rustow 1970; Przeworski 1986) explain democracy as 
the end product of several developmental stages – economic growth leading to political development, which in 
turn transitions into modernization and ultimately democracy.  Such processes require adherence to these 
sequenced transitions and, as Huntington (1993: 5) argues, are a lengthy process. Thus, reversion from such 
process would impede the growth of democracy.  
Within process theory, Rustow (1970) and Przeworski (1986) emphasize the catalytic role of elites in 
the democratisation process. The power held by elites ensures their influence on societal conditions and rules as 
well as changes in the formal and informal structures of the political system. Thus, in order for democracy to 
thrive, elites must agree on democratic goals and norms as a mechanism for the distribution of power and 
resources in the society and on an effective system to institutionalise conflict (Przeworski 1986: 41-63).  More 
relevant to this study, however, are theoretical perspectives which focus on external dimensions of democracy 
promotion.   
International/External Theories 
The external dimension of democratisation can be divided into two theories; military interventionism 
and financial theories of democratisation.  These two theories are the principal blocks explain democratic 
development of a country with external support. The American support to Ghana’s democratic development 
must be explained within the context of one of these theories.  
Based within realism, military intervention theory suggests the behaviour of states is seen as the pursuit 
of national interests governed by the use of power; specifically, democracy is obtained through external 
intervention (Talentino 2005: 19). Regime change through the use of power by an external force is justified 
through contention that the regime is illegitimate.   
According to military intervention theory, a state can employ any means to pursue its foreign policy 
objectives so long as such means are in line with the overriding goal of security and survival (Evans 2006). 
While the use of direct military intervention is principally used for the purposes of national survival or high-
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priority goals such as humanitarian grounds and the promotion of human rights, most often it has been employed 
as a last resort to achieve foreign policy objectives as it is seen as both expensive and risky to implement (Evans 
2006).  
While military interventionism has its roots in Thucydides through Machiavelli, it has been discredited 
in democracy literature as a coercive tactic for rich, powerful, industrialised states to exert power over poor, less 
powerful states (Lowenthal 1991).  The objective of such behavior is an effort to compel poorer states to act in a 
manner which is in the best interest of rich countries or to behave in a manner in which powerful nations 
considers permissible in the international system (Jamieson 2005).  Such stance is supported by Lowenthal’s 
(1991) research on the US’s use of military intervention as a foreign policy tool.  American ‘efforts to promote 
democracy through military intervention have generally yielded negligible, often counterproductive, and only 
occasionally positive results’ (Lowenthal 1991: 261).  According to Whitehead (1991: 234) there is a grave 
contradiction in a state compelling other independent states to be free. Thus, democracy must be built on 
foundations of popular sovereignty and freedom of the people to determine their own future rather than imposed 
by outsiders (Whitehead 1991: 234). 
Comparatively, financial transfer theories support the growth of democracy from an external agent 
through the use of financial and technical aid (Al-Momani 2003). Financial transfer theory suggests that states 
are capable of determining and influencing political systems and political classes of other states to the extent of 
changing a regime without the use of the military (Al-Momani 2003). Thus, rather than military might, resources 
are capable of changing ideas, ideals and values. Such change is conducted within one of two strategic theories - 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign Aid theories of democratisation. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is an investment made by a foreign individual or organisation in 
productive capacity of another country. It involves the transfers of assets or intermediary products within the 
investing enterprise without any change in ownership. Foreign direct investment (FDI) theory suggests there is a 
direct correlation between the level of democratisation and that of FDI in a country (Quan & Resnick 2003). 
While FDI does not initiate democracy, it facilitates the development of democratic institutions such as structural 
features of recipient countries since it is the dividend of good governance. A country’s attractiveness to foreign 
direct investment is contingent on the nature of its political system or governance (Quan & Resnick 2003).  
Thus, investors generally consider a political system, where an independent judiciary protects their investment 
rather than adjudicate cases. Consequently, developing African nations have acceded to such assessments as the 
African Peer Review Mechanism to advertise their democratic credentials as a mechanism to persuade investors.   
Olson (1993: 567-576) argues that such criterion as an independent judiciary and electoral programmes 
help to guarantee property rights and, hence, ensure that investments are secure long term.  Thus, investors 
favour such regimes because their assets are shielded from predatory dictators.  
In contrast, O’ Donnell & Schmitter (1986) suggests that rather than supporting democratisation, FDI 
hinders such growth due to the intimate relationship between investors and political leaders. Competition for 
investment ensures that investors are given preferential treatment with regards to wage, labour and taxation 
leeway at the expense of the rights of citizenry (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986).  
Comparatively, a second component of financial transfer is foreign aid theory which argues developed 
democracies provide direct and indirect material and technical assistance to transitional countries to sustain these 
countries in democracy building – such as building credible elections and democratic institutions with the 
objectives of invigorating democratic growth (Garvey 1966).  
Williamson and Haggard (1994: 526) consider foreign aid an external incentive to reward new and 
growing democracies in their embryonic stage and support regimes in stabilising their internal politics and thus, 
citizen rights.  Similarly, Apodaca and Stohl (1999: 185-198), adopting foreign aid as a dependent variable and 
human rights record as independent, examined the relationship between human rights and US bilateral foreign 
aid over a period of nineteen years (1979-1996). They conclude that with the exception of the Clinton 
administration, human rights played a critical role in determining whether a country qualifies as a good candidate 
to receive aid and the amount of aid so received (Apodaca & Stohl 1999: 197). 
Regan (1995: 613-628), however, using the same framework, investigated the effect of aid on changes 
in human rights records of countries supported by the Reagan and Carter administrations.  The study established 
that, economic and political aid had no discernible effects on the human rights records of the recipient country 
and incapable to determine its political system. 
Similarly, Al-Momani 2003 study assessed the impact of US foreign aid on emerging democracies over 
an eighteen-year period (1976-1994). While the study covered a large scope - 174 developed and developing 
countries - the findings indicate comparatively little impact of international financial transfers on level of 
democracy (Al-Momani 2003).  
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Additionally, Finkel et al. (2006) studied the effects of US democracy assistance on democracy 
building – specifically the growth of democratic values and institutions.  While again a large sample was studied 
- 195 countries over a period of 13 years (1990-2003) – conclusions found that there was general growth in all 
countries studied. Thus, the positive impact of foreign aid on democratisation is modest in nature (Finkel et al. 
2006).   
Despite these findings, in determining the effects of American aid on Ghana’s democratisation process, 
foreign aid theory is best suited.  By evaluating the role of American aid – the independent variable – on the 
growth in democratic development in Ghana - dependent variable – conclusions can be drawn with regards to the 
effectiveness and validity of such support.   
DEMOCRACY AID DEBATES 
Funding democratisation is the result of the international donor community’s response to the challenges 
of the new ‘wave’ of democratisation in the late 1980s (Santiso 2000: 1). Embracing democracy assistance as 
one of its core priorities, the international donor community actively shapes national democratisation processes. 
Diamond et al. (1999) suggest that such molding is proactive by stating that  
[p]erhaps the most distinctive feature of the third wave…is the considerable contribution that 
international actors have made to democratic development by enhancing the resources, skills, techniques, ideas, 
linkages and legitimacy of civil society organizations, civic education efforts, the mass media, legislatures, local 
governments, judicial systems, political parties, and elections commissions in the developing and post-
communist worlds. The prospects for democracy in the world will be much brighter if these many currents of 
practical engagement are sustained, refined and widened (171). 
The catalogue of programmes targeted by democracy assistance is extensive, ranging from electoral 
assistance supporting free and fair elections to reform of government institutions through constitutional 
engineering to security sector reforms and the strengthening of civil society organizations (Crawford 2001: 89). 
While certainly each of these can be proactive steps towards democratisation, motives behind their 
implementation and the way in which programmes are carried out determines the actual benefit to the receiving 
country and citizenry (Carothers 1997: 110).   
International donors have increasingly provided donor aid in support of democracy promotion since the 
end of the Cold War (Diamond 2004). Diamond (2004: 264) theorizes that aid to the developing world is driven 
by a long-standing development model which assumes the missing key ingredient for development is finance. 
This developmental economic model further postulates that if external donors provide the needed resources to 
fill the gap between a country’s own capacities and the required level of investment, economic development 
would take place (Diamond 2004: 264).   
Comparatively, Karl (2000), citing examples from Nigeria, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Cameroon, argues that the core problem obstructing economic development in Africa is not the lack of 
resources - though that is a grave quandary to many countries on the continent - but the inefficient management 
and allocation of available resources to ensure equal benefit between citizens. What is required, therefore, is a 
well-developed system of checks and balances rather than continual influx of funds (Karl 2000).   
Despite the foundational differences in the process toward democracy, what is apparent in both 
positions is that the proposition that a country’s democracy is intricately linked to its ability to develop 
economically.  While such position has certainly been as the basis for such policies as the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAP) of the 1980s, the results of which suggest that such development practice seems at odds in 
today’s 21st Century knowledge economy.  Yet, despite this new knowledge, funding democracy by encouraging 
economic development continues across the world. According to Carothers (2000), the American Government 
has consistently devoted US$500 million annually to fund programmes that promote democracy globally since 
the mid-1980s. These resources, ranging from small-scale civic education assistance to massive multilateral 
collaboration, are meant to fund programmes designed to fortify democratic institutions, processes and ideals in 
the targeted countries. These perspectives provide the required direction and framework for the paper.  
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN AID 
The genesis of the US’ international development assistance can be traced to the end of World War II 
with the formation of the European Recovery Programme of 1948 - also known as the Marshall Plan. The 
Marshall Plan was motivated by a combination of humanitarian concern, strategic efforts to curtail Soviet 
influence in Eastern Europe and the need to restore the European market for American goods (Zimmerman 
1958). By October, 1951, the US’ strategy had shifted to military aid and defense assistance and, to a lesser 
extent, economic and food aid in the form of the Mutual Security Administration (MSA). Communist fears, real 
and imagined, propelled and nurtured the growing importance of the MSA (Zimmerman 1958). MSA economic 
project components were designed to utilise large sums of money to build economic structures and political 
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allegiances abroad deemed necessary to subvert the spread of communist ideals (Zimmerman 1958).  It was not 
until the beginning of the 1980s that democracy promotion became one of the four core priorities of US foreign 
aid programmes (Carothers 1997: 120).  While the rise of democracy aid during the period was the result of 
President Reagan’s anti-communist policies, this foreign policy has been followed by all successive US 
governments. 
Models of Implementation 
The concept of democracy embarked on by the US is characterised as institutional modeling. The 
philosophy of institutional modelling is to nurture socio-political institutions of democracy in a developing 
country in a manner resembling the counter-part in western countries (Carothers 1997: 116). According to 
Carothers (1997: 116), democracy assistance is consequently meant to facilitate such modelling processes.  
However, the strategy of institutional modelling faces two limitations to democratic development; 
Americanisation and the failure to recognize local political structures.  
Campbell et al. (2004: 11) defines Americanisation as ‘the cultural, political and economic influence of 
the USA which shapes the way in which people perceive and understand difference.  Thus, democracy assistance 
aims to strengthen endpoints of institutions to function with the requisite inputs and resources in a form similar 
to that in the US without consideration of alternative forms and types of democracy (Campbell et al. 2004: 11). 
US democracy support promotes an independent and robust legislature which oversees the responsibilities and 
actions of the executive branch of the government.  Increasing accountability through such venues as alternative 
media outlets – that is private ownership of media as an alternative to government-owned operations – detaching 
race and religion from political affiliation, strengthening the capacities of trade unions to increase bargaining 
power are all further elements of the US’s model of democracy promotion abroad (Campbell et al.2004).   
Yet, adhering to this framework of power division, separation of state and privatisation, ensures policy-
makers discard and devalue the distinctive qualities of cooperation between the legislature and the executive; a 
cooperation Boafo-Arthur (1998) argues is essential in early stages of democratic promotion.  The results of such 
framework can be detrimental to a country’s successful transition to democracy as was the case in Ghana in 1979 
where, as a result of separation of power, the national budget and economic policy was not approved by 
Parliament.   Additionally, privatizing broadcasting systems detracts from the citizens’ inputs obtained through 
public ownership.  
The second flaw in this framework is the lack of recognition and appreciation for local power structures 
in the recipient country. Evaluating the local structures of beneficiaries receiving democracy promoting aid is 
essential to ensuring appropriate outputs (Carothers 1997).  Such step, however, is often missing in the US’ 
strategy. The sociological, economic and political factors and actors which shape local institutions are typically 
relegated to the background in pursuit of democracy promotion activities. Instead of evaluating and working 
with local institutional structures, US democracy promotion assistance is provided under the conditions of 
performing within American defined roles and strategies.  It is within these understandings of the structure of 
American democracy aid that an evaluation of such aid to Ghana’s Fourth Republic was examined.  
 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AID TO GHANA 
The success of Ghana’s transition to the Fourth Republic, compared to its previous three attempts, is 
credited to the enormous financial support the country received from the international community (Boafo-Arthur 
1998: 16). Boafo-Arthur (1998) argues the extent and magnitude of support provided by external partners raises 
doubt as to whether the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) would have continued with the transition 
programme without the involvement of the donor community (Boafo-Arthur 1998: 17). While seemingly 
necessary in the transition, the impact of such assistance continues to be debated especially in the face of a 
simultaneous growing economy and growing inequality within the Ghanaian population.  
As Ghana progressed towards democracy, civil society as well as state institutions played a pertinent 
role in the process. The ability to achieve pro-democracy ventures conducting elections, educating citizenry of 
their rights and responsibilities as well as the development of governance institutions. These programmes by 
both the state and non-state actors required colossal resources by various stakeholders (Hearn 1997: 11). The 
frailty of stakeholders’ internal structures, however, accentuated by the lack of requisite financial resources for 
pro-democracy actors to realize this objective, necessitated the contribution of external support in the country’s 
democratisation process.   
Gyimah-Boadi (2004: 126) argues that international development partners refocused development 
assistance shifting from a pro-state focus to one supporting the development of civil society and other non-state 
institutions. This refocus came as a result of the increasing importance civil society plays in holding the state 
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accountable (Gyimah-Boadi 2004: 126). Bilateral and multilateral agencies consequently utilized the opportunity 
to enhance democratic development.  
During the post-Cold War era, the funding arena shifted from one in which aid was directed directly to 
state institutions for economic development, to one in which civil society orgnanisations were encouraged to 
actively participate in the democratic process.  As a result, the American Government and US-based organization 
provided support to promote democracy in Ghana via civil society organizations and the American State 
Department - for example, the American Embassy in Ghana and the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID).  
The table below demonstrates the refocus of democracy assistance as provided by the US to sectors 
within Ghana during the period of 1994-2003. As the table outlines, initial democracy funding was targeted at 
the electoral system development with USAID and its implementing agencies investing enormous resources to 
establish a credible electoral platform for democratic development and growth after several years of military 
rule, and particularly, the controversies which surrounded the 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections.  
Assistance to civil society, which started with small amounts in 1995, gradually climbed to compete with other 
sectors of democratic development. 
TABLE 1: 
Sectoral distribution of democracy support to Ghana 1994-2003 in million dollars. 
 
Year 
Electio
ns 
Rule of 
Law 
Civil 
Society Governance 
1994 2.55 0 0 0 
1995 4.35 0.39 0.2 0 
1996 2.24 0.39 0.31 0.01 
1997 0.44 0 0.38 0.64 
1998 0.07 0 0.51 1.02 
1999 0.54 0 0.59 0.83 
2000 0.47 0 0.63 0.82 
2001 0 0 0.49 0.93 
2002 0 0 0.58 0.76 
2003 0 0.04 0.86 0.51 
Source: Report of Assessment of Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building 1990-2003 
 
While certainly including CSOs in democracy-funded initiatives was a welcome shift in funding 
arrangements, it remained just that – rhetoric, rather than reality. The funding agency rather than the recipient 
still largely controlled the implementation of such programmes.  American Non-Governmental Organisations, 
such as the International Foundation for Elections Systems (IFES) and the National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs (NDI), were made the implementing agencies of USAID democratic support to Ghana 
because the office of USAID argued that there were no developed, experienced and credible local pro-
democracy NGOs in Ghana which could implement their programmes (Hansen 1996).  It was with this 
understanding of the capacities of Ghanaian NGOs and CSOs and in specific coordination with this new focus 
that between 1996 and 2009, USAID, through its partners, initiated two projects to enhance the development of 
civil society at the local level – Enhancing Civil Society Effectiveness at the Local Level (ECSELL) and the 
Government Accountability Improves Trust (GAIT). 
 
Enhancing Civil Society Effectiveness at the Local Level (ECSELL) 
ECSELL was a project designed by USAID and implemented by the International Foundation of 
Elections System (IFES). The project was a follow-up to political and election-related programmes implemented 
by IFES on behalf of the USAID under the cooperative agreement, ‘Supporting the Electoral Process’ (STEP). 
The ECSELL project was a political capacity building venture which aimed to increase the capacity of civic 
groups to achieve their primary goals and to advocate and improve local government responsiveness to citizen’s 
demands. Its core objective was to strengthen the interaction between civil society and local government units in 
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selected districts through training and disbursement of small grants. It aimed to enable groups to embark on 
appropriate civic engagement programmes with their respective District Assemblies (DAs). USAID channeled 
democratic assistance through IFES to civil society groups in all of Ghana’s ten regions working in a total of 
twenty of the 110 districts. The beneficiary organisations or groups had limited contact with the main benefactor 
USAID. 
USAID-Ghana generally classified civil society groups into development organisations, trade unions, 
advocacy groups and service providers for the implementation of its broad national programme. This 
classification was adopted by IFES because it promoted the inclusion of a broad segment of the civil society. 
IFES first conducted a baseline study to evaluate the challenges confronting the development of the civil society 
at the local level in particular as well as the problems of local governance in Ghana with reference to the DAs. 
IFES reviewed civil society with regards to the level of funding, the degree of internal democracy and the 
relations with the DAs. Furthermore, IFES examined the state of CSOs internal operations, the quality of 
relations with the national government and the extent of engagement with the civic groups in the district. IFES 
followed this assessment by addressing the problems impeding the development of civil society at the local level. 
It provided training in basic management skills for civic leaders and local government officials to facilitate their 
collaboration in solving the problems confronting the district.  
Government Accountability Improves Trust (GAIT) 
The GAIT project was a continuation of the USAID civil society empowerment programme which 
began with the implementation of ECSELL in the selected districts. The policy direction of the project shifted 
from the regular participation of civic groups in the decentralization process to include accountability of public 
office holders in the districts; hence leading to the name Government Accountability Improves Trust (GAIT).  
The GAIT project was implemented by the Cooperative League of the United States of America (CLUSA) and 
aimed, essentially, to continue the work of ECSELL with the added element of increasing the accountability of 
government stakeholders.  The implementation of the project was executed in two phases: phase one between 
2011-2004 and phase two between 2005-2009.   
The second phase of the GAIT programme (2005-2009) progressed from fostering partnerships between 
civil society and local government to include community participation in education. The selection of the districts 
for GAIT II was based on competitive bidding to encourage full participation of CUs and DAs. Proposals were 
jointly submitted and defended by a team made up of CUs and the DA.  
The GAIT project is the local governance component of an overall USAID-Ghana Democracy and 
Governance programme. The purpose of the GAIT project is to strengthen the management and organizational 
capabilities of civil society organizations to the level where they can be effective partners in local governance 
and contribute to national policy formulation.  Thus, the GAIT project aimed to: increase the capacity of Ghana 
CSOs to advocate the interest of their members at the local government level; promote transparency, 
accountability and anti-corruption in local governance institutions; and increase voter turnout and political 
participation of CSOs at all levels of government.  Strategies to meet objectives involved building CSO planning 
and management capacities, promoting CSO networks, establishing discussion platforms between key CU 
members, DA members and citizens, and providing modest matching grants by GAIT to CUs. 
 
                                         DISCUSSIONS AND RESULTS OF RESEARCH 
ESCELL Project 
a) Strengthening the capacity of civil society to meet primary goals of members 
In spite of the importance of a strategic plan to the development of a civic entity (Pearce et al. 1987: 
658), less than 5% of the civic groups that IFES interacted with across the country had prepared strategic plans 
prior to the ECSELL project. Consequently, their management practices were precarious. As a first step, IFES 
offered several management training programmes to the leadership and the members of civic groups at different 
levels with modules on strategic planning and implementation. Hair Dressers and Beauticians Association of 
Nadowli and Fian Women’s Groups were amongst the beneficiaries.  The objectives were to equip the groups 
with very basic management tools. IFES considered it significant for the civic groups to assess their operations 
without working with strategic plans. IFES then supported them to draw up appropriate strategic plans to enable 
them to articulate and aggregate the concerns of the citizenry in their localities. At the end of the project 79.2% 
of the civic groups had drawn modest strategic plans for their organisations to ensure that they would achieve 
their primary objectives.  
b) Strengthening the capacity of CSOs to advocate 
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The capacity of the civic groups and CUs to advocate was measured using the following indices: 
improvement in the internal democratic practice; linkages with other civic groups; and ability to mobilize 
resources.  
i. Improvement in the internal democratic practice  
CSOs which promote democracy as part of their external goals must also demonstrate appropriate 
internal democratic practice in their organization in order to provide the required political legitimacy for their 
activities (Brysk 2000: 151). Committee elections and decision making processes were examined to measure the 
extent of internal democracy practiced within associations. 
The study assessed the electoral process of each association that was a member of the CUs in the 
selected districts. Of the 28 associations interviewed, 75% selected their leaders through elections. About 25% of 
the associations corroborated that there were irregular and to some extend no elections before the intervention of 
the projects. The study, however, could not evaluate how free and fair the elections were, although secondary 
sources from their respective district electoral officers suggested that EC officers had supervised those elections.  
A second important feature of liberal democracy is the decision-making structure manifested in the 
extent of articulation and aggregation of individual voice (Owusu 1972, as cited in Boafo-Arthur 1993: 114). An 
organisation is undemocratic when the leadership controls the decision-making process. The study shows that 
members actively participated in the decision-making process within their organisations. Findings demonstrated 
comprehensive decision-making arrangements within the civic group: 3.6% of the civic groups make decisions 
through the executive committees and consensus; decisions made by the entire membership of the association 
constituted 21.40%; 71.40% of members of the associations maintain that decisions are made by the members 
and the executive committees in association. A combined participation in the decision-making process increases 
members’ sense of ownership. Additionally, it provides the ability and capacity of its leadership to educate 
members on prevailing conditions and the consequences of decisions made.  Results of data analysis suggested 
that the civic organisations that implemented the ECSELL programme developed internal organizational 
democracy and provided the required space for members to participate in governance.  
 
ii. Development of networks and linkages 
Further results demonstrated that 55.6% of the civic groups belonged to a vertical network before the 
introduction of ECSELL. After participating in the ECSELL programme, 87.50% of the civic groups were 
integrated into at least one network either horizontal or vertical. The ECSELL project revealed that artisans and 
professional group bodies joined resources to champion a common cause such as the collection of revenues on 
behalf of the DA. The networks equipped members with skills and knowledge to improve their efficiency and 
broadened understandings of governance through programmes such as organised trips to Parliament.   
Through the ECSELL project, a number of civic groups such as Feo Leather Workers Associations in 
Bongo and Butchers Association in Wa re-established intra and inter-professional networks. Although some of 
the professional groups did already belong to their national associations, their participation in ECSELL provided 
new impetus in terms of redefinition of mandate and direction of organisations. Civic groups from the ECSELL 
districts were able to properly articulate and aggregate interest amongst members. 
iii. Ability to mobilize resources to promote primary objectives 
The ECSELL project fostered collaboration between the state and civic groups. The small grant 
component of the project for example was jointly administered by civic groups and their respective DAs. 
Following various training programmes conducted by IFES, small grants of an average of USD $400 per grant 
were disbursed to 78 civil society groups representing 36% of civic groups that applied for support in the 20 
selected districts in the country. IFES provided a total of US $32,000 in small grants to the civic groups (IFES: 
2006). Six CUs and 72 individual civic groups benefited from the support. The objectives of the award were to 
strengthen the capacity of civic groups to advocate and implement the ideas and knowledge acquired during the 
training programmes and to support their fund-raising activities. Civic groups and unions utilized the small 
grants for various projects, ranging from civic education programmes, such as the Parliamentary Candidates’ 
debates in 2000, and other programmes that focused on the need and the mechanism of preventing bush fire 
outbreaks.   
c) Enhanced local government responsiveness to citizens’ demands 
The third objective of ECSELL was to improve local government responsiveness to citizens’ demands. 
Local priorities differ between DAs and citizens, especially where citizens’ participation in DA programmes is 
minimal. Consequently, the ECSELL project supported the DAs to be responsive to the demands of the local 
population as well as strengthen the capacity of the civil society groups to engage with DAs through various 
advocacy programmes.  
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Prior to the inception of the ECSELL project, the DAs regarded civic groups as important stakeholders 
in good governance. The civic groups in these districts were considered as development partners who could 
provide alternatives to programmes modelled and implemented by DAs. However, it was at the discretion of the 
DAs to recognize as well as legitimize these groups. For a group to be considered legitimate, it had to meet all 
DA stated conditions of a patron-client relationship such as a willingness to support the ruling political party and 
its programmes.  
After the implementation of the ECSELL project and as a result of the cordial interaction established 
between CUs and DAs, the CUs in some districts were given the mandate to mobilize taxes and DA rates from 
their members on behalf of DAs on commission basis. In Nadowli, this system worked very well. Each party 
adhered to the contractual agreement outlined in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The system 
continued to serve the interest of both parties. However, in Ada, the Dangbe East DA did not adhere to the 
agreement. CU members collected the appropriate taxes on behalf of the DA but were refused payment of the 
previously agreed upon commission. This resulted in a series of civil disobedience by the CU. Hence, during the 
entire 2000 financial year, none of the CU members paid taxes or other rates to the DA. According to the 
Dangbe East DA, the problem arose from poor communication between the out-going and in-coming District 
Coordinating Directors.   
Government Accountability Improve Trust (GAIT) Project 
a) Improved collaboration between DAs and CUs to support good governance 
Before the GAIT project, the majority of DAs and CSOs worked separately to achieve their primary 
objectives. Analyzed data collected from the field suggested 56.8% of CSOs had no direct working relationship 
or official business with DAs. Of respondents, 25% considered the DA to be hostile towards CSOs in the 
districts and only 20.3% indicated the existence of cordial relationships with DAs. After GAIT’s 
implementation, the relationship between the DAs and CUs improved. Only 14.9% of the CUs claimed that the 
CUs and DAs did not interact in comparison to 56.8% before GAIT implementation. Additionally, the hostile 
relationship between CSOs and DAs reduced from 25% to 2.7%. Correspondingly, the atmosphere of cordiality 
improved tremendously from 20.3% to 82.4%.   
The growth of cordial relations between DAs and CUs was mutually beneficial.  It enabled civic groups 
to articulate their interests more easily and ensured DAs saw civic groups as valuable stakeholders for 
government programme implementation as well as effective channels for revenue mobilization for the 
Assemblies.  
b) Participatory decision-making in development planning  
The GAIT project offered leadership training to CSOs and DAs as a mechanism to involve various 
stakeholders at the district level in the development process. As part of the training, leaders were educated on 
community opportunities and key responsibilities requited for community benefit. DA staff and CUs attended 
workshops together which provided space for CUs to articulate community concerns to the DA. Evaluations in 
districts where GAIT pulled out confirmed that DAs continue to support working with CUs to consolidate gains 
achieved.  
c) Formation of networks and coalition building among CSOs 
The GAIT project encouraged CUs to form networks beyond their communities to advocate on issues of 
mutual community concern. As a result, the Northern Network of Civil Society was established for the three 
Northern Regions - Upper East, Upper West and Northern. In the Volta Region, Volta Regional Network of CUs 
(VONCU) was established to facilitate cooperation, idea sharing and regional problem solving. VONCU 
developed and signed an MOU with MPs from the Volta Region. The National Network of CUs also emerged to 
campaign on issues raised at the regional or zone level and brought them to the attention of the state. Networks 
also developed with organisations; in Wa and Bole, for example, CUs teamed up with Plan International and 
Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA) respectively to undertake joint civic education programmes.  
d) Demanding accountability from the DAs 
CUs initiated several programmes with the objective of promoting vertical accountability in local 
communities. CUs began the process by actively contacting public office holders, either individually or 
collectively with specific demands and sometimes backed with financial contributions. Before the GAIT project, 
only 12.2% of CU members had the basic knowledge of the internal accountability structures of the DAs while 
12.3% of CU members directly demanded accountability from DAs. Transparency and accountability increased 
in various districts as a result of GAIT. As a result of advocacy programs in Techiman, the municipal DA began 
displaying the cost of all development projects undertaken from 2001 to 2004 on public notice boards to inform 
the general public about DAs’ expenditure. The CU in Damango organized public information sharing on 
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various government policies such as the Youth Employment Programme and the National Health Insurance 
Scheme.  
CUs used the most pragmatic available means to obtain answers from the DAs; letters and demand 
notices to their respective DAs, questions during ‘Peoples DA’ sessions, questions during DA programmes either 
individually or a combination of them. Letters constituted 55.8% of the total requests made to DAs. The CUs 
regarded this mechanism as most appropriate because it allowed for easy follow-up and helped to form 
relationships as discussions were held before letters sent. Some CSOs continued to use DAs’ internal 
accountability structures such as those on procurement, budgeting and auditing procedure. However, there are 
legal limits to their involvement and the extent of use of such internal accountability structures.  
e) Participatory budgeting  
A participatory budgeting process has become an integral part of the public administration, especially in 
developing countries. Integrating a diversity of interests remains critical to the success of the budgeting process. 
In a study of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, Mehrotra (2006:12) observed that such process 
deepens democratic decentralization and improves output indicators of services delivered by the state. Although 
the GAIT project did not satisfy all these requirements of participatory budgeting, it made a significant 
contribution to the DAs budgeting process.  
f) Revenue mobilization and financial dynamism 
CUs introduced a number of dynamic financial measures to bolster DAs’ revenue bases. In Bole, 
government officials occupying state bungalows without paying the requisite rent were compelled by CUs to 
honour their obligations to the DA. DAs involved CUs in revenue mobilization to demonstrate that CUs are 
partners in development and to emphasize the importance of working together. Findings demonstrated CUs’ 
contributions to revenue mobilization strengthened their relationship with DAs and outlined their progressive 
contribution to the communities which they serve.  
g) Contributions to Districts’ revenue bases  
CU advocacy programmes administered through GAIT projects made tremendous contributions to the 
Internally Generated Fund (IGF) of some districts. CUs signed MOUs with their respective DAs to help in the 
collection of revenue in exchange for a small commission; which resulted in mutual revenue increases.  As an 
incentive to CUs, Assemblies appointed executive committee members of CUs into various DA committees.  
h) Promoting women in governance  
The women’s wings of CUs actively participated in education campaigns on issues relating to the 
domestic violence bill. Women organised sensitisation workshops in markets on topics affecting the well-being 
of women and children. These included testing for breast cancer and girl child education. Advocacy campaigns 
by women were considered successful because they created awareness of issues which hitherto were not given 
priority in the community.  
The GAIT project encouraged equal opportunity for men and women to contribute to advocacy 
programmes. A cumulative total of 97.1 % of respondents claimed that the project was sensitive to the plight of 
women and provided equal opportunity for both male and female to engage the DA. This is highly commendable 
compared to the national governance matrix ratio of 1:9 in favour of men.    
i) Dialogue between citizens and Assemblies 
Through CUs, the GAIT project bridged the gap between DAs and citizens. The initiative started with a 
dissemination of programmes and information from the district to the individual citizen. In Wa, Nadowli, Bongo 
and Damango, suggestion boxes were located at vantage points where individuals could express their views on 
governance in the district to the DA in the language of their choice. Public notice boards were also erected in 
Bole where citizens were informed about progress and development in the district. Furthermore, CUs in various 
districts engaged their DAs in the provision of social services to improve quality of life. Water was an 
engagement issue which permeated most districts and heightened the dialogue between citizens and DAs.  
 
ANALYSIS 
While certainly an impressive amount of funding was provided to IFES from USAID in order to 
implemented both the ECSELL and GAIT programmes, the key results from these programs come from the 
practical outputs CSOs gained as a result of their participation rather than an economic development.  The 
emphasis on skill development, and increasing transparency and collaboration were the clear benefits of the 
programme and highlight the importance funding can have when channeled in the appropriate avenues. 
While significant progress was made to increase the democratic process in Ghana, questions remain as 
to the sustainability of such progress in the face of project conclusion and thus a lack of support – both technical 
and financial.  What is evident from the findings above is that the financial aspect of the projects were highly 
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important. Not only did they provide the necessary funds and resources for program participants to participate, 
but also they offered clear objectives to work towards and guidelines for targeting this work.  Were the support 
mechanisms put in place by both projects strong enough to ensure continuation at the individual community 
level or did the temporary funding demonstrate solely a temporary success? Did project participants invest in the 
program objectives to the extent that they will promote its longevity post funding? Ultimately, such questions 
emphasize the importance of effective project planning regardless of where project funding originates.   
 The clear success of the implementation of both projects emphasize the importance of a 
number of key project and funding elements – specifically with regards to sustainability.  The clear discrepancy 
in transparency and collaboration between communities involved in the projects and those which were not, 
highlight the importance implementing project elements on the large-scale and ensuring clear key lessons are 
adequately learnt and thus enforced. 
CUs proved highly effective at bridging the gap between the DAs and the citizenry. They served as a 
common platform where divergent opinions based on occupational and sectional interests could be aggregated. 
They provided space for demanding accountability from public office holders - elected and appointed - 
facilitating dialogue between the DAs and citizens to ensure transparency. Generally, they became the umbrella 
body by which civil society engaged the state and participated in local governance leading to greater 
accountability, transparency, and improved governance. Institutionalizing the CU concept throughout the 
country, extending the concept to all 170 districts in Ghana, could have been an essential part of the initial 
project planning. That the project did not incorporate this aspect, but instead gathered data for reporting on 
democracy growth within civil society in Ghana, seems to demonstrate the short-sighted nature of some US aid 
projects.   
Additionally, Bräutigam(2000)argues that aid programs require clear leadership for sustainability and 
providing such leadership is greatly challenging especially in a constrained donor and resource environment.  
Both the ECSELL and GAIT projects demonstrate that while individuals were often eager to take on CU 
leadership roles – arguably seduced by the power and stature of their positions - sustaining enthusiasm and 
momentum of civic interaction in local governance proved greatly challenging. The fervour for demanding 
accountability wanes as leaders begin to taste benefits of integration into the inner DA systems. Currently, CU 
leaders do not have tenure of office and are seen as emperors who are unwilling to share power or hand over 
responsibilities irrespective of their ability and availability. Additionally, transfer of power and responsibilities 
within CUs pose huge challenges for CU leadership. In Bole, for example, four key executive members left the 
town to pursue personal development opportunities - education, marriage, employment - without handing over 
responsibilities. In Berekum, three core executive committee members left the union without replacement. This 
created a vacuum and caused the loss of institutional memory for future generations of CU leaders. As a 
consequence, the new executive committee had to reinvent the dialogue process with DA. Thus, it is important to 
have a defined tenure of office for CU leaders and a mechanism of transfer of power and responsibilities 
amongst CU members.  Without these clear leadership roles and terms of reference for exchanges of power, the 
same corruption that plagues many national governments across Africa continues is none-the-less emulated at 
the local level.  
Further challenging the continuity and independence of projects’ successes are issues of sustainable funding.  
Critics of donor aid projects, cite the sudden loss of resources at a project’s end, without adequate avenues for 
potential support or self-sustaining resources as a major oversight of development practitioners(Dichte 2003; 
Kosack. 2003;Riddell 1987). Such was the case for both the ECSELL and GAIT projects.  Integrating economic 
opportunities into the projects with the objective of building the economic capacity of CU members could have 
improved their financial status and ensured high commitment to the programme. In similar local governance 
programmes such as the Local Regional Economic Development (LRED) implemented by GTZ, appropriate 
approaches of harnessing local resources for income generation were integrated into the programme which 
empowered the communities economically as well as politically. The integration of economic opportunities into 
the programmes will ensure that CU members who invest their time in advocacy programmes will reap 
economic dividends thus continuing their efforts.  Thus, the single-sited nature of both projects – political 
transparency, accountability and collaboration - neglects the interdisciplinary reality of political systems. 
Political systems do not stand alone but function interconnected with social and economic systems.  
 Aside from these program specific aspects, central to the debate around democratization aid 
are issues of exit strategy.  While the US’s contribution to Ghana’s development process has been noted above as 
not only substantial, but in the case of the ESCELL and GAIT projects, highly effective at active collaboration 
and transparency and encouraging citizens to see their right to such processes, there is little evidence of 
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sustainable and systemic change strategies post project cycle. Stark criticism for quick exit strategies which lead 
to limited project outcome follow-through continue to plague many US funded projects through Africa.  
The current exit strategy implemented by USAID is detrimental to the development of a dynamic civic 
advocacy culture as it fails to consider three key exit processes: a mutually agreed upon end date and procedure 
of exit by key stakeholders, strategies and supports for project sustainability, and effective transfer of 
responsibilities through the selection of a new project lead. Both the GAIT and ECSELL projects were 
withdrawn without concern for any of the above processes leading to mass layoff of staff and national service 
personnel. Without developing a clear exit strategy which is effectively communicated to successive leaders, 
avenues for growth and further development remain limited at best.   
Khang & Moe (2008) argue that an effective project management cycle is one that, overall, represents 
clarity – specifically in terms of leadership, terms of reference involves, and subsequent funding.  In the case of 
both ESCELL and GAIT, these elements were overlooked. What was necessary to build on the programmes 
successes was the identification of a project lead and provision of appropriate training needs, the identification of 
subsidiary stakeholders, the development of relationships and terms of reference between stakeholders and a 
clear monitoring and evaluation system and, perhaps quite obviously, determined opportunities for funding the 
project post US-funds.  Thus the issues surrounding democracy aid are not so much the funding in the case of 
Ghana’s ESCELL and GAIT projects, but their sustainability oversight and limited scope.  
 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the research results that foreign financial and technical support could serve as a catalyst 
for empowering civil society organizations to be active participants in their development and democratic 
processes. This contribution and collaboration proved, in both the ECSELL and GAIT programs, to be driving 
force in greater democratic processes such as improved transparency and accountability from government 
stakeholders to their constituents. The ECSELL projected lead to the formation of CUs.  CUs proved to bridge 
the gap between the community and DAs and also serve as the link between the DAs and the various civil 
society groups. This led to convergence of interest between various decentralized departments and communities’ 
needs. The effective formation of CUs, their contribution to communities and the community and local 
government support they received seems to address a long held challenge to democratic development; that low 
economic status prevents sovereign citizens from ensuring their representatives are responsive and accountable 
(Ninsin 1993:184). Although other aspects of Ninsin’s (1993) proposition, such as mass illiteracy, ignorance and 
superstition continue to remain threats to democratic development in Ghana, the financial and technical support 
CUs received from USAID, to a large degree, enhanced their participation in the democratic process at the local 
level and thus enhanced democracy overall. Ultimately, the support, both financial and technical, provided by 
USAID ensured the active formation of CUs in project districts and thus the democratic enhancement of those 
districts.  The formation of CUs remains to be seen in non-project districts and the spectrum of democracy 
remains limited, thus suggesting the importance of such aid and programming.   
The gains made in democratic development by civil society through CUs further contest conclusions by 
theorists (Carothers & Ottaway 2000; Hearn 2003: 22; Brown 2005: 15) who suggest that democratic assistance 
to civil society depicts a picture of disappointment in terms of democratic outcomes and dividends derived from 
such investments. The advocacy responsibilities entrusted to CUs by civil society helped to establish an 
improved relationship between the CSOs and DAs in the project implemented districts. Improved relationships 
enhanced local government’s responsiveness to citizens’ demands and community concerns. In various districts 
– Techiman and Berekum - CUs and DAs collaboratively bid for projects. Such enhanced relationships 
confirmed Gaventa’s (2004:10) assertion that with appropriate support, citizens and governments could 
collaborate in new ways to participate, deliberate and develop solutions to pressing social, economic and 
community development issues. Such collaboration improved citizens’ ability to make informed political choices 
as well as provided a platform for civic education programmes on various government policy directions.                   
In ECSELL and GAIT projects areas, CUs participated in the preparation of district budgets and 
revenue mobilization. The improved relations between the DAs and the CUs contributed to the strengthening of 
local governance in these districts. Budgets were based on the needs of the community.  Challenges to revenue 
mobilization were amended as CSOs and DAs partnered and CSOs became the community sensitization agents 
for revenue mobilization.      
Ultimately, the level of transparency and accountability in project area DAs was considerably 
improved. The study identified several areas of engagement between the CUs and the DAs ranging from 
participation, financial mobilization, performance monitoring as well as accountability. The GAIT project has 
rejuvenated effective accountability systems in DAs through CUs’ programmes. Budget hearings were 
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conducted with diverse stakeholders before DAs’ approval. As part of the drive to improve accountability 
through transparency as espoused by Broz (2002: 1), analyses of various DA budget estimates were made by 
relevant stakeholders. CUs were able to monitor and assess the implementation of various components of the 
budget. This contributed to the prudent use of public resources thus increasing effectiveness and efficiency, 
which are critical virtues in public administration.    
CUs further encouraged the DAs to publish the cost of projects they had executed on public notice 
boards. This publication served as the basis of investigating projects, which in the view of civil society could 
provide opportunity for public office holders to engage in financial malfeasance. Access to such critical 
information enabled civil society to hold DAs accountable for the use and management of public resources.  
DAs responded to the demands of CUs to provide a number of social services for the communities. 
Fulfilling community aspirations is an critical index to measure that democracy is on track (Papadopoulos 2007: 
2). The formation of CUs strengthened networks and ensured community needs were brought forth into political 
schema. 
As demonstrated in these conclusions, USAID support in the form of technical and financial resources, 
has contributed significantly to support the democratization process in Ghana’s civil society. What is emphasized 
is the importance foreign aid played in the democratisation process of Ghana’s Fourth Republic. While such 
conclusion can be drawn, missing elements into the discussion of democracy aid, such as the impact and 
influence of donor assistance on the priorities of governments and citizens alike, demand further research. As 
noted above, there is a real propensity to take advantage of positions of power is enticing in a constrained donor 
and resource environment. Leaders in developing countries have to make difficult choices between either 
financing democracy and its related institutions or, financing other pressing social services such as security, 
education, health, water and infrastructure. Complicated with rampant corruption that has plagued many nations’ 
pasts – and in some cases, presents – democracy is further constrained.  Thus, foreign aid is especially critical 
where the cost and sophistication of democracy have become too high.  
Consequently, the hypothesis of the paper, that the USAID democratic support in the form of ECSELL 
and GAIT projects at the local level enhanced the formation and operation of Civic Unions, which subsequently 
improved civil society activism at the local level, is hereby accepted.  This affirms the position held by the 
financial transfer theorists, that aid has the capacity to influence the governance structure of a society and 
country by enlarging the political space for citizenry to participate in their own affairs.    
Ghana, as it officially becomes a middle-income country, is faced with the additional challenge of 
managing a fast growing economy – the fasted in West Africa – against an equally fast growing social, political 
and economic inequality.  Faced with such a reality, democratic foundations such as transparency, accountability 
and civil society and state collaboration become even more pertinent.  If Ghana is to continue to hold its 
successful international designation as a ‘stable democracy’ and middle-income country, it must ensure the aid it 
receives is tied to the conditions of sustainability, longevity and skill development for a 21st Century knowledge 
economy.  Without these elements, real and practiced democratic processes remained limited to the funding that 
promotes them rather than the ability to grow a culture and constituency who are self-sustainable and self-
empowering and active agents in their own development processes.   
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